Why did Americans vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election? Social scientists have proposed a variety of explanations, including economic dissatisfaction, sexism, racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia. The current study establishes that, independent of these influences, voting for Trump was, at least for many Americans, a symbolic defense of the United States' perceived Christian heritage. Data from a national probability sample of Americans surveyed soon after the 2016 election shows that greater adherence to Christian nationalist ideology was a robust predictor of voting for Trump, even after controlling for economic dissatisfaction, sexism, anti-black prejudice, anti-Muslim refugee attitudes, and anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as measures of religion, sociodemographics, and political identity more generally. These findings indicate that Christian nationalist ideology-although correlated with a variety of class-based, sexist, racist, and ethnocentric views-is not synonymous with, reducible to, or strictly epiphenomenal of such views. Rather, Christian nationalism operates as a unique and independent ideology that can influence political actions by calling forth a defense of mythological narratives about America's distinctively Christian heritage and future.
INTRODUCTION

Following the election of Donald Trump as the 45
th President of the United States, many sociologists have attempted to explain the decisions of the American electorate (Kreiss 2017; Mast 2017; Norton 2017) . Scholars have connected support for Donald Trump to economic anxieties or dissatisfaction (Berezin 2017; Edgell 2017; Schafner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2017) , sexist attitudes toward women (Edgell 2017; Schaffner et al. 2017; Wayne, Valentino, and Ocena 2016) , anti-black prejudice (Ekins 2017; McElwee and McDaniel 2017; Sides 2017 ),
anti-Muslim and Islamophobic beliefs often couched in terms of concerns about "terrorism" or "refugees" (Blair 2016; Gorski 2017; Hell and Steinmetz 2017; Sides 2017) , and racist or xenophobic attitudes often manifested in concerns about Mexican immigrants and support for a border wall with Mexico (Edgell 2017; Jones and Kiley 2016; McElwee and McDaniel 2017; Schaffner et al. 2017) . A related theory, one that is often closely linked with the other proposed influences, is that support for Donald Trump represented a defense of America's supposed Christian heritage in the eyes of many Americans Gorski 2016 Gorski , 2017 Jones 2016:241-249) . We refer to this pervasive set of beliefs and ideals that merge American and Christian group memberships-along with their histories and futures-as Christian nationalism (Gorski 2010 ).
The present study extends research on the current political and cultural landscape in the U.S. by examining the extent to which Christian nationalist ideology represented a unique and independent influence leading to the Trump Presidency-one that is related to, but not synonymous with, reducible to, or mere reflection of economic anxieties, sexism, racism, Islamaphobia, or xenophobia per se. Our study makes three contributions in this regard. First, while research has focused on campaign rhetoric or polls leading up to the election (e.g., Berezin 2017; Braunstein 2017; Gorski 2017), we draw on data from a probability sample of American adults surveyed soon after the November 2016 election that included a question about vote choice. As a result, we are able to more thoroughly examine if and how Christian nationalism, along with other factors, predicts actual voting outcomes. Relatedly, while other quantitative data sources from after the election have included limited measures tapping respondents' views about America's Christian identity (e.g., Ekins 2017; PRRI 2017; Sides 2017) , our data contain a unique variety of measures about Christian nationalism, allowing for better measurement, validity, and reliability of findings about Christian nationalism and voting for Trump. Third, because the data also contain measures for attitudes toward women and gender issues, African
Americans, Muslims, immigrants, and economic dissatisfaction, along with a host of other religious and political characteristics, we are better able to discern the independent effects of Christian nationalism and ensure that it is not merely acting as a proxy for other forms of intolerance, traditionalism, or religious and political variables known to be related to vote choice.
We begin by briefly summarizing the various structural and cultural influences of Trump support proposed in past research. We further define the concept of Christian nationalism and outline its potential relationship with other cultural influences of Trump support, while also delineating it as a potentially unique and independent influence. We then test a general hypothesis about the relationship between Christian nationalism and Trump voting using data from a national probability sample of Americans taken soon after the 2016 Presidential election.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VOTING FOR TRUMP
Within the burgeoning literature seeking to explain Donald Trump's surprising victory in the 2016 Presidential election, scholarship has consistently focused on a confluence of five key factors: white working class economic anxieties, misogyny, anti-black prejudice, fear of Islamic terrorism, and xenophobia (see Edgell 2017; Ekins 2017) . Polls leading up to and following the election found that white working class men and women in the American rust belt (particularly in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania) were the strongest supporters of Donald Trump (Berezin 2017) . Scholars have argued that much of the pro-Trump sentiment of this constituency, many of whom voted for Obama in the previous two elections, was owed to their increasing insecurity about their economic and social position in the U.S. (Berezin 2017; Edgell 2017; Schaffner et al. 2017; Wayne et al. 2016) . For this population, it is argued, Trump was successfully able to speak to economic dissatisfaction and juxtapose his outspoken, no-apologies, populist appeal to Clinton's perceived liberal elitism (Berezin 2017; Sides 2017) .
Despite the popularity of class-based explanations in popular discourse, however, several studies have shown that other cultural commitments played an even larger role in attracting potential voters to Trump. In their analysis of representative data looking at likely voters just prior to the election, Schaffner et al. (2017) found that holding "hostile" sexist attitudes was the strongest predictor of respondents likely voting for Trump, more so than economic dissatisfaction or racism. In a similar study, Wayne et al. (2016) found in a representative sample of citizens in June 2016 that sexist attitudes were a stronger predictor of Trump support than authoritarian tendencies, ethnocentrism, or anxieties about the economy. Racism, and specifically anti-black prejudice, was also shown to powerfully predict the Trump vote. Drawing on the 2016 post-election American National Election Studies, McElwee and McDaniel (2017) found that blaming African Americans for their societal disadvantages or feeling that blacks have too much influence in society were stronger predictors of voting for Trump than economic anxiety or attitudes toward immigration (see similar findings in Ekins 2017 and Sides 2017) .
Concerns about the threat of Islamic culture and terrorism, having heightened in the last decade since 9/11 (Bail 2012; Edgell et al. 2016) , also motivated support for Trump. Republican candidates in the primaries and leading up to the 2016 election were able to play upon rising Islamophobia by framing Muslims as cultural enemies, outsiders, and others  see also Hell and Steinmetz 2017 ). Trump's supporters were more likely to be particularly fearful of refugees from Muslim countries or "terrorism," which has become code for Muslims (Ekins 2017; Griffin and Teixeira 2017; Sides 2017 Huang et al. 2016; McElwee and McDaniel 2017) .
Related to, but distinct from these factors, scholars have also identified within Trump's message and among many of his supporters a commitment to a particular vision of the nation's religious identity and heritage: Christian nationalism Ekins 2017; Gorski 2016 Gorski , 2017 ; see also Braunstein and Taylor 2017) .
CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM AND VOTING FOR TRUMP
While American "civil religion" and "Christian nationalism" are closely connected in that both present a narrative and origin myth that expresses purpose and unites those who adhere to it, there are important difference between the two (Gorski 2010 (Gorski , 2016 (Gorski , 2017 . Civil religion, on the one hand, often refers to America's covenantal relationship with a divine Creator who promises blessings for the nation for fulfilling its responsibility to defend liberty and justice. While vaguely connected to Christianity, appeals to civil religion rarely refer to Jesus Christ or other explicitly Christian symbols (Bellah 1967; Gorski 2017) . Christian nationalism, however, draws its roots from "Old Testament" parallels between America and Israel, who was commanded to maintain cultural and blood purity, often through war, conquest, and separatism. Unlike civil religion, historical and contemporary appeals to Christian nationalism are often quite explicitly evangelical, and consequently, imply the exclusion of other religious faiths or cultures (Delehanty, Edgell, and Stewart 2017) . Also paralleling Old Testament Israel, Christian nationalism is often linked with racialist sentiments, equating cultural purity with racial or ethnic exclusion (see, for example, Barkun 1997; Whitehead 2015a, 2015b; Williams 2013) .
Unlike civil religion, contemporary manifestations of Christian nationalism can be unmoored from traditional moral import, emphasizing only its notions of exclusion and apocalyptic war and conquest (Gorski 2016) . Trump represents a prime example of this trend in that he is not traditionally religious or recognized (even by his supporters) to be of high moral character, facts which ultimately did little to dissuade his many religious supporters. In this way, the Christian nation myth can function as a symbolic boundary uniting both personally religious and irreligious members of conservative groups (Braunstein and Taylor 2017) . In this respect
Christian nationalism, while more common among white conservative Protestants (Jones 2016; Perry and Whitehead 2015a) , also provides a resilient and malleable set of symbols that is not beholden to any particular institution, affiliation, or moral tradition (Delehanty et al. 2017 Trump's Christian nationalist rhetoric also expressed a particular eschatology of America's future (Gorski 2016 (Gorski , 2017 , emphasizing how America was once a great nation, but had rapidly disintegrated under the influences of Barack Obama, terrorism, and illegal immigration. Trump's promise was to restore America to its past glory, a point he made most clearly with his ubiquitous slogan emblazoned upon red hats. The catchphrase has even been refashioned into a Christian hymn. The 2017 BRS was a self-administered pen and paper survey with a mail-based collection. The sample was selected using ABS (Address Based Sample) methodology based on a simple stratified sample design, which helps manage the coverage problems of telephone-based samples and ensures adequate coverage for various sub-populations (Hispanic, African American, younger). All subsequent analyses use sample weights constructed to match the known demographic characteristics of the U.S. adult population. A total of 1,501 completed surveys were returned from a sampling frame of 11,000 for a 13.6 percent response rate. respondents who reported voting in the 2016 presidential election.
( Table 1 about Table 1 ). "Christian nation") and performed ancillary analyses to examine if this alternate measurement strategy was similarly predictive. Christian nationalism measured in this way is also strongly and significantly associated with voting for Trump. Results from these models are in Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Figure 1 . 8 An additional control variable that could have influenced Christian nationalism's association with voting for Trump is differential levels of respondents' attention to the media and candidates' speeches/debates. Fortunately, the 2017 BRS asked: "In the year leading up to the 2016 presidential election, did you… Watch or listen to political debates or candidate's speeches?" Possible response options were "Yes" and "No". We included this measure in ancillary models and it was marginally significant (p<0.10). An interaction term between Christian nationalism and watching/listening to debates/speeches was also non-significant. Results available upon request. 9 The 2017 BRS asks for respondents' level of agreement (strongly disagree to strongly agree) with the following statements: (1) "Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than most women," (2) "It is God's will that women care for children," (3) "A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works," and (4) "A husband should earn a larger salary than his wife." This index has a Cronbach's α = 0.77 and ranges from 4 to 16. These questions and this index appear in a variety of prior studies (Perry and Whitehead 2016; Whitehead 2012 Whitehead , 2014 . Regrettably, these measures do not account for more virulent forms of misogyny. Accounting for sexism is particularly relevant given that this election was the first where a woman was a major party Presidential candidate and the gender difference between candidates was a consistent theme in media coverage. We also performed ancillary analyses that included each of these religious practice variables separately in the models. We find that frequency of prayer is significantly and negatively associated with voting for Trump, while religious service attendance and frequency of reading sacred texts are not significantly associated with Trump voting (see Froese and Uecker 2017 for greater detail). 11 In ancillary analyses we also examined interaction terms between each racial category and the Christian nationalism index in order to determine if the association of Christian nationalism with voting for Trump differed across racial categories. These interaction terms were non-significant but also limited by small subsamples of minorities. Consequently, it will be important for future research concerning Christian nationalism and support for Trump to continue to explore the intersection of race, religion, and politics (Edgell 2017; Frost and Edgell 2017) . Results available upon request.
urban), education (1 = 8 th grade or less to 9 = Post-graduate), and income (1 = $10,000 or less to 7 = $150,001 or more).
12
Plan of Analysis
Because the dependent variable of interest is dichotomous, we use binary logistic regression models for multivariate analyses. To account for missing data in the 2017 BRS, we employed multiple imputation (MI) techniques. 13 We provide standardized beta coefficients in order to examine substantive significance beyond mere statistical significance. 14 The proportional reduction in error (PRE) estimate for each model is an average of the PRE scores across all five imputation models. 15 Table 2 examines the Christian nationalism index and Figure   1 uses results from the full model to graphically display the predicted probabilities of voting for
Trump across levels of the Christian nationalism index for respondents with different political party affiliations. All control variables in the predicted probability equation were set to their respective means, including political ideology.
To examine the potential interplay between Christian nationalism and other variables of interest in predicting Trump voting further, we used PROCESS mediation modeling (see Hayes 2013; Hayes 2004, 2008) . This mediation procedure is a form of path modeling based in regression analyses (Darlington and Hayes 2017: 447-477) . It allows for the assessment 12 In supplementary analyses we tested models with categorical coding for income and education, and coding for multiple categories for location of residence (suburb, small town, rural), while also rotating the contrast categories for all of these measures. These alternate coding strategies did not change the results for these or other variables in the models. Results available upon request. 13 Using SAS 9.3, this procedure generates five imputed datasets using multiple Markov Chains based on all variables included in the models, resulting in an overall N of 7,505 (1,501 x 5). All analyses draw on the MI datasets. The results reported in Table 2 use the MI ANALYZE procedure in SAS. It combines all the results from the five imputations to generate overall estimates, standard errors, and significance tests. The mediation analyses tested PROCESS models on pooled data from the five imputed datasets. 14 These are estimated as * = ( / ) and using Pampel's (2000) simplification of assuming that the standard deviation of logit(y) = 1.8138. 15 PRE used is the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square / -2 Log Likelihood Intercept Only. of multiple mediators simultaneously and uses bootstrapping procedures to generate more accurate (bias-corrected) estimates of indirect effects than other methods of assessing indirect effects (MacKinnon et al. 2002) .
We used this modeling procedure in two ways. First, we examine whether there are significant indirect effects for religious practice and beliefs by virtue of their influence on relative levels of Christian nationalism. This allows us to assess the extent to which Christian nationalism functioned as a primary mechanism shaping the "religious vote" in the 2016
Presidential election. The results from these models are presented in Table 3 . Second, we used a multiple mediator model as an assessment of the relative independence of the effect of Christian nationalism on Trump voting by examining whether the statistical relationship between these two variables is substantially mediated by the measures of racial bias, xenophobia, and Islamophobia.
The results of this model are presented in Figure 2 . Table 2 to vote for Trump. Conversely, black respondents, city-dwellers, the more highly educated, political independents, and Democrats were all significantly less likely to vote for Trump.
RESULTS
( Table 2 about can only be fully understood by examining their indirect effects, which occur by predicting differential levels of Christian nationalism. These findings bolster the claim that how Americans understand the role of religion in public life, something distinct from private religiosity, is an important and separate potential causal factor for explaining various attitudes and behaviors (Stewart et al. in press ).
Christian nationalists' support for Trump is interesting considering his widely-recognized "anti-Christian" behavior and beliefs. For instance, Trump's documented bragging about sexually assaulting women, endorsing physical violence against his enemies, mocking the disabled, and questioning whether he has any need to apologize to God would, in most circumstances, be actions despised by many self-identified Christians in the U.S. However, as Gorski (2016 Gorski ( , 2017 points out, this brand of religious nationalism appears to be unmoored from traditional Christian ideals and morality, and also tends toward authoritarian figures and righteous indignation.
Ironically, Christian nationalism is focused on preserving a perceived Christian identity for America irrespective of the means by which such a project would be achieved. Some see Trump as a "tool"-used by God in this particular moment in history-who will be dispensed with when he is no longer serving God's purposes (Jamieson 2016) . In this sense, Christian nationalism is deeply consequentialist. In an equally important way, however, Christian nationalism can be as expressive as it is instrumental (Braunstein and Taylor 2017; Gorski 2016 Gorski , 2017 . For many Americans, particularly Christian nationalists, voting for Trump had less to do with his religious bona fides and was instead an expressive outlet for the perceived religious backsliding of the United States. The expressive nature of Christian nationalism might have also tapped into perceived discrimination Trump voters felt they experienced during the Obama administration. While the current analysis is unable to account for respondents' perceived discrimination, it is another likely alternative explanation of the Trump vote and interrelated to Christian nationalism, much like the various other alternative explanations measured above.
It is also important to note that we are not arguing that Trump's deployment of Christian nationalist rhetoric on the campaign trail was outside the norm for other Republican candidates.
In fact, many of his statements mirror those used by his competitors in the GOP primaries.
However, Trump does represent an interesting departure-and thus an interesting test of the importance of Christian nationalism-because he appears to be such a poor personal representative of a traditional religious conservative compared to evangelical Christians like George W. Bush, or Ted Cruz in the 2016 Republican primaries. It seems Christian nationalist rhetoric can be used effectively by almost anyone promising to defend America's "Christian heritage," even a thrice married, non-pious, self-proclaimed public playboy. As a test of the power of Christian nationalist rhetoric regardless of personal piety, it is hard to trump Trump.
While our focus has been on the independent and significant association between Table 2 ). While one study cannot definitively establish which factors played a significant role in support for Trump in 2016, these findings indicate that Islamophobia and Christian nationalism are the explanations with the most empirical support.
Beyond the 2016 Presidential election, future research should examine Christian nationalism and its relation to various contentious topics animating politics and civil society in the United States, as well as future voting patterns at multiple levels of governance. As a flexible and pervasive set of beliefs and ideals, the influence of Christian nationalism will likely prove important across a wide range of contexts. It is especially critical to examine Christian nationalism and its significance in subcultures and social arenas both inside and outside of institutional religions. It could be that dissimilar groups equally utilize the symbolic resources of Christian nationalism to reinforce their motivations for particular strategies of action; however, there are also likely to be variations in relationships between Christian nationalism and other aspects of ideology and behavior across religious and subcultural contexts. Future research using qualitative interviews would be ideal for further discerning themes and narratives in Americans' support for Christian nationalism, and also for allowing people to state their own views about the relationship between Christianity and American identity, which will help clarify the various social-psychological mechanisms connecting Christian nationalism to various other issues. Of course, the relative prevalence of particular themes will also vary across time and cultural contexts (Whitehead and Scheitle 2017) .
Both before and since the election of Trump, researchers and pundits have hailed the end of "white, Christian America" (Jones 2016 ). Due to various demographic and religious trends across generations that cannot be easily reversed, it is clear that, as a bloc, white Protestants will never again enjoy a demographic majority in the U.S. and will also likely decline in cultural hegemony over time. Despite these demographic trends, however, it is critical to acknowledge that the influence of Christian nationalism can outlive the decline of its progenitors. Although the group of Americans most closely associated with America's perceived Christian heritage (white Protestants) might decline, Christian nationalism is not reducible to or strictly defined by this particular demographic group or its associated religious tradition(s), and can influence narratives and action beyond institutional religion. Furthermore, Christian nationalism may be particularly influential in that it can be used to unite disparate groups within a common narrative, while also implicitly excluding groups that are cultural "others." While white Christians might be declining demographically, one of their primary cultural creations will remain a powerful political force for years, and elections, to come. 
